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Abstract—Forensic investigation is an essential response strat-
egy following a cyber-related incident, and forensic readiness is
the capability to gather critical digital information and maximize
its use as evidence. The effectiveness of this data is highly
dependent on the readiness, quality, and trustworthiness of the
data itself. Far from a passive post-analysis tool, there have been
many instances where an organization has benefited from gath-
ering, and using, digital evidence to improve their cyber-security
and mitigate future incidents. This article examines the forensic
readiness of the maritime sector, a core component of global trade
and a unique combination of information/operational technology
and people, to understand its investigation and mitigation ca-
pabilities. Once the readiness of maritime forensic investigation
has been better understood, by comparing it to other sectors
and using risk scenarios, this paper proposes actions toward
improvement. These steps are built from established attempts to
increase investigation capabilities and improve maritime cyber-
security, but address the maritime sector specifically.
Index Terms—forensic readiness, cyber, maritime, risk
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently 90% of worldwide trade is transported by ships
and handled by ports [1], [2]. In terms of value, e-commerce
alone was last estimated at £26 trillion in 2018 [3]. As
such, maritime transport is an integral part of the global
infrastructure and events that damage, delay, or misplace
shipments can have significant widespread effects on a nation’s
economy, stability, and people. In 2011, the first EU maritime-
cyber report showed alarmingly low awareness and protection,
and more recent studies highlight significant concerns as
technology advances faster than it can be fully secured [4],
[5]. Other studies have revealed more specific maritime-cyber
vulnerabilities [6], [7] or how behind maritime cyber-security
is [8]. However, there is currently no wider understanding of
the maritime cyber-threat due to the low amount of evidence
available both publicly and internally. This gap has not gone
unnoticed, as the UK Department for Transport recently re-
leased a call to gather evidence in areas like maritime security
[9]. This is an indication that the cyber-forensic capabilities
within modern shipping are currently insufficient.
While forensic readiness and cyber-related investigations
are a regular practice in other sectors, it is less prevalent
in maritime, particularly within ship operations. As shipping
becomes more technologically advanced, and with the rise of
remote-control and autonomy within ports and ships [10], [11],
cyber-risks also grow. It is also important to note that port-side
and ship-side forensic readiness are not currently equal. As a
large part of port infrastructure is more similar to other shore-
based IT-based businesses, they can gain forensic capabilities
from existing frameworks and protocols. Ship-side systems,
however, are both less well understood forensically and unique
to maritime, making existing solutions harder to adapt.
The forensic readiness of individual sectors worldwide
have not developed similarly over time, as change is heavily
influenced by events and sector-specific risks. For example, in
a business context like financial banks, there was no incentive
or opportunity to actively collect cyber-related evidence (e.g.,
transactions, logs, emails, network captures) until significant
funds were threatened. Banks were initially wary of sharing
cyber-vulnerabilities with competitors, and it was not until
benefits outweighed the risks did they collaborate [12]. Ev-
idence gathered by the finance sector since then, anonymized
to protect individuals, is collected in advance of an incident
and serves both the collecting organization and wider sector.
Particularly when responding to an event, e.g. data breach,
readiness for quick and thorough investigations are pivotal for
a quick recovery with minimal financial or reputation damage.
Similarly, transportation sectors airborne or on land (e.g.,
trains) were somewhat lacking in forensic readiness until
significant risks arose. Certain risks, ranging from general
concerns to terrorism [13], [14], encouraged these sectors to
be forensic ready. Compared to shipping, incidents in these
sectors are also more visible to the public, whose opinion can
drive decisions. Unlike other businesses primarily based infor-
mation technology (IT) (e.g., finance), transportation sectors
also require operational technology (OT) for physical actions.
This mandates forensic capabilities for cyber-physical events
as well, an overlap of cyber and physical worlds [14]. In
maritime, while forensic readiness for physical events and
human error are currently held to high standards, readiness
for cyber-related events has yet to reach the same levels.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II establishes
what forensic readiness is for maritime, considering ports,
ships, IT, and OT. Section III continues to evaluate maritime
forensic capabilities today, particularly when facing current
risks. This includes a range of cyber, cyber-physical incidents
that this industry will likely need to be prepared for. Lastly,
Section IV proposes steps for increasing forensic readiness
within the maritime sector, similar to previous business IT
focused forensic readiness plans [15].
II. ESTABLISHING FORENSIC READINESS
To evaluate the forensic readiness of the evolving mar-
itime sector, i.e. its ability to accurately depict cyber-related
events using evidence, we analyse its current capabilities
for gathering, storing, and investigating with forensic data.
Digital evidence is essential in managing the impact of risks,
particularly in this digital age [16], and as both cyber and
cyber-physical risks rise at port and at sea. This article define
cyber-physical, based on [14], [17], as physical attacks with
a cyber-element aid or outcome, cyber-attacks made possible
with physical action, or cyber-attacks with physical outcomes.
Despite several known risks [6], [18], surveys show that the
sector is, on the whole, not prepared for detailed investigations.
Of the 350 individual respondents in [18], 16% have reported
their own company was victim of a cyber-related incident
within the last 12 months, however, only 56% of participants
had a business continuity plan, making it likely that even a
smaller percentage of those organizations is suitably forensic
ready. Participants also claimed 33% of incident response
and recovery took days or weeks, however, as this is based
on personal responses and not digital evidence, it is likely
that some incidents, particularly sophisticated ones, have gone
unnoticed, unreported, or misclassified as human error [11].
Considering accidents and attacks, with outcomes ranging
from minor to major, cyber to physical, if digital evidence
is not gathered prior and during a maritime incident, it may
be too late to do so later. The cyber-element is also not
easily seen, particularly when crew are untrained to recognize
it (which Section IV tries to improve) and systems are not
configured to store digital evidence. For example, navigation
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System)
systems normally have an underlying Windows OS running
out of sight [19]. Ship crew, normally, only ever see the
ECDIS application running, making human-in-the-loop detec-
tion unlikely. Additionally, there are no International Maritime
Organization (IMO) requirements for cyber-related ECDIS
evidence to be stored, which may illustrate low forensic
capabilities [20]. By analysing regulations set by the IMO
and others for ships (e.g., sensors, communication, navigation
[6]) and ports (e.g., business IT, terminals, industrial control
systems, monitoring [10]), there is a low likelihood that the
average organisation are using forensic-ready systems. This is
dangerous considering the malicious players in existence [7].
A. Forensic Readiness in Ports
Ports globally handle operations off-shore, on-shore, inland,
manually, semi-autonomously, and autonomously [10]. Their
forensic readiness can be divided into two areas; the well-
known IT business and the IT/OT management of cargo and
ships. With most IT systems, forensic readiness is relatively
standard, centred around on work machines, devices like
smartphones, company servers, communication channels (e.g.,
email, telephone, Skype) and networks (e.g., internet, intranet)
[16]. In comparison, OT systems and networks like SCADA
[21] may include machinery (e.g., cranes), sensors (e.g.,
temperature), cyber-physical security (e.g., electronic locks)
and other intelligent devices. Digital evidence such as CCTV,
digital and physical access logs, and transfer of privileges
are also useful. Based on recent events, it is likely that the
business side of ports is somewhat forensic ready, as the recent
MAERSK and COSCO events [22], [23] showed them able to
quickly understand and patch vulnerabilities.
The operational technology of ports, however, is not as
well established. This includes the loading and unloading of
cargo and the servicing (e.g., mooring, refitting, refuelling)
of ships. One example of a gap in forensic readiness was
demonstrated in the late analysis port terminal vulnerabilities
used to smuggle [10]. Although physical security of these
terminals may have been increased to restrict access, and the
business side was improved to reduce infection vectors, it does
not seem like the forensic readiness of these terminals have
been increased. Therefore it is unclear what the current state of
digital evidence collection is, however ship-based smuggling
(e.g., drugs, weapons) and human trafficking are still massive
problems in the modern world [24], [25]. Better evidence, in
quantity and quality, is likely needed to improve the situation.
B. Forensic Readiness on Ships
Unlike ports, the risks and forensic needs of ships are highly
divergent from traditional systems [6] and past studies [15] do
not address the unique aspects of maritime transportation. In
addition to the storage of log files etc., it becomes necessary
to retain digital evidence on location, cargo status, fuel, and
bridge readings from systems like ECDIS and RADAR [26].
While a number of physical-related evidence is stored digitally
and used by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch
(MAIB), there are currently no procedures set in place to even
identify the necessary forensic evidence sources for cyber-
related events, let alone gather and analyse them.
The MAIB currently investigates physical incidents using
evidence stored in the maritime equivalent of an airplane
“black-box” [27]. Unfortunately, it does not currently have the
ability to store cyber-related evidence as the system interface
language used does not support it. Furthermore, individual
IMO regulations do not require cyber-related evidence to be
made available. Knowing the practices and technical limita-
tions of ship systems, it is safe to establish that ships are not
forensic ready for cyber-related events, despite them being
found vulnerable [4], [7], [11] and responsible for some of
the largest cases in illegal trafficking [24], [25]. An added
complexity with evidence stored locally on a ship, often at
sea for months, are insider threats which could tamper with
evidence [28]. If implemented correctly, however, forensic
evidence could help deter the growing number of external (e.g.,
pirate) [29] and internal crime [30], [31].
III. MARITIME CYBER INVESTIGATION NEEDS
One of the foremost issues in assessing this sector’s forensic
needs is understanding the scope and range of cyber-risks [17].
While there are well-known risk assessment tools like NIST,
as currently defined they are unlikely to provide full com-
prehensive risk views within maritime. Most noticeably, the
NIST frameworks primarily considers IT, with little coverage
of OT in a maritime setting or interconnected IT/OT [32], [33].
NIST may be applicable to ports, however, on ship IT/OT
systems there is an added complexity of frequent changes
TABLE I
SCENARIO NUMBER AND CYBER-RISK DETAILS [17].
1 Malware is introduced to the ship bridge via USB with required
chart updates and causes system to lag.
2 Autonomous ship software needs to be updated remotely but
satellite connection is vulnerable
3 Localized jamming is used on a ship of high value with the aid
of social engineering to install jamming device
4 Shore-based jamming delays operations of a river-ferry that relies
on ship-to-shore radio signals to dock
5 Denial of sensor readings for critical operations causes crew
confusion and reduces their confidence in bridge sensor readings
6 Traffic jam at geographic choke-point, a tunnel or strait, caused
by lost connection with engine
7 GPS spoofing causes incident with a new high-profile ship,
causing huge reputation damage to the shipbuilders
8 Navigation misdirection caused by spoofing virtual buoys to
increases ship-shore collision risks in low-visibility conditions
in environmental, personnel, and technical factors, as ships
move physically and through cyberspace. This also may make
NIST less applicable to the range of ship types and crimes
(e.g., information theft, physical theft, damage, misdirection).
Lastly, isolation and limitations during transit negatively affect
ship risks in a way most assessments do not measure, so
risk assessment frameworks designed for maritime, like [26],
may reveal more risks with more realistic risk profiles. These
may better describe the risk impacts and better define the
evidence requirements for future investigations, how to obtain
the evidence, and how use it to mitigate those risks.
Once maritime organizations fully recognize the need for
investigative capabilities to combat risk, its next step is to
ensure it is forensic ready across both IT and OT systems.
IT/OT convergence is prevalent and growing in this sector
[26], as a number of both system types work in conjunction.
Compromising one or more of those systems could lead to a
number of cyber and/or physical outcomes.
To illustrate how forensic evidence can help investigate
maritime-cyber risks, we adapted risk scenarios from [17] into
Table I and made Table II. Most cyber-related, and some
physical, evidence in Table II are not currently gathered,
demonstrating what categories of new evidence would be use-
ful to properly investigate these kinds of risk scenarios. While
evidence in some categories (i.e., environmental, video, and
audio) are being gathered for investigating human action and
physical incidents, new subcategories for cyber will need to
be introduced for more comprehensive forensic readiness, e.g.
third-party networks. Physical evidence is also not exclusive
to OT, for example, scenario 8 would require evidence such as
position, but physical evidence in scenario 5 would be derived
from the OT systems responsible for engine and fuel.
The last question before discussing potential steps for im-
proving maritime forensic readiness, is whether organizations
have the funding for it. In general, companies have been
persuaded by the recent, large-scale, and expensive cyber-
incidents to raise their security budges by at least 5% in 2019
[34]. It is likely the maritime will follow this trend, if not
surpass it, given the most recent and viable incidents recently
[22], [23] and current budget trends [18].
TABLE II
EVIDENCE NEEDED TO INVESTIGATE TABLE I SCENARIOS.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Computer C/P C C/P C/P C C
Network/Comms C P C/P C/P C C
Video/Audio C/P P P C/P P
Supply chain C/P C C/P C/P C
Environment P P P P P
Sociotechnical C C C C C
C = cyber evidence P = physical evidence
IV. STEPS FOR FORENSIC READINESS IN MARITIME
From the content in Sections II and III, this section proposes
steps to improve the gathering of cyber-related evidence in the
maritime sector, without interfering with shipping operations
and business processes. The end-objective is to set in place
procedures and evidence standards so maritime organizations,
including individuals across this sector, can fully investigate
potential crimes, accidents, and disputes to minimize negative
impacts and improve general safety in several capacities. As
discussed previously, this is only possible if investigations are
made using useful, trustworthy data by the proper parties.
To acquire the most effective set of IT/OT evidence in the
maritime context, we propose the seven following steps, sim-
ilar to established patterns of general forensic readiness [15].
Unlike previous studies, the following seven-step procedure is
aimed at improving the forensic readiness of ports and ships.
It is likely that these will have a more significant impact to
ship security due to the current levels of forensic capabilities.
Step 1 Define the range of risk scenarios involving ship and
port environments (e.g., [26]) to determine their requirements
for readily available digital evidence. This, effectively, is a
risk assessment that would consider human, IT, and OT assets.
Each organisation should preform the appropriate assessments
as a fishing boat will have a different risk profile than a fully
autonomous cargo port. Organization should also determine
compliance with legal constrains and commercial agreements.
Step 2 Identify sources and endpoints, within IT/OT sys-
tems, internally and externally for various types of evidence
(e.g., logs, screenshots, network captures, voice). Namely
which systems (e.g., IT servers, ship sensors) generate data in-
cluding format, amount, and frequency and what the end con-
sumers of that data is. The endpoints of data can be categorized
in normal business (e.g., shipping efficiency) and incident-
related evidence. Organizations may also clearly determine the
ownership of certain data to establish responsibilities.
Step 3 Provide secure collection and transfer methods for
evidence between established sources and endpoints, such as
secure local storage and trusted external parties (e.g., insurance
firm). Security is important to prevent data tampering, but
collection must also be cost-effective and accessible. For
example, many ship engine systems are off-line, but provide
critical evidence. An incident may also flood or damage these
systems, so a cost effective approach may be to periodically,
physically, transfer evidence to the bridge, where it can be
stored and retrieved more securely and reliably.
Step 4 Establish cyber, cyber-physical, policy for accessing,
handling, and exchanging digital evidence. The engine room
scenario would apply, but a more fitting example would be
cargo tags which hold data on cargo, sender, receiver, and
more, but also physically move a great deal across land and
ocean. It is important to ensure cyber evidence policy, e.g. e-
signatures, securely collects data in transit or during transfers.
Step 5 Specify circumstances when investigations should be
held internally (e.g., ship-based, organization based) or exter-
nally (e.g., MAIB) based on incident details, companies and
countries involved, loss of life, and data ownership/sensitivity.
Step 6 Train staff, crew to management, in cyber-incident
awareness and secure evidence handling by establishing clear
responsibilities. For example, if the crew want to access
forensic data during a voyage (e.g., unusual internet usage),
they should be trained to prevent evidence tainting and how not
to break international and national laws, e.g., when pursuing
an alleged hacker. Knowing how to process, or securely pass-
on, data is also a basis for training at all levels.
Step 7 Establish or modify protocols for evidence-based
documentation on cyber-related incidents. This may include
internal report formats or anonymized reports to be shared
with other maritime industries for sector-wide mitigation.
Of course, each of these steps require more in-depth actions
at technical, policy, and training levels. However, these are
presented as an initial start to securing better forensic readiness
within the maritime sector, as there is a likely need for
better investigation capabilities regarding cyber-related events.
This is not intended as a protection scheme, although it may
help inform better defences. Moreover it is assumed that
the appropriate preventative defensive cyber-security measures
will be in place with the evidence collectors and storage. It is
our intention to continue developing an understanding of the
unique nature of maritime risks and to use that understanding
to better forensic readiness at port and in transit on ships.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While the maritime sector is facing an exciting time of
technical and economic growth, the downside is that cyber
risks and crime are becoming more prevalent. In this article
we believe that forensic readiness is key to understanding and
mitigating cyber-related incidents, however, when compared
to other sectors, the maritime sector seems behind, particu-
larly ship-side. Currently, there is no capacity or policy to
drive cohesive forensic readiness across this sector in order
to investigate known, and unknown, risks and concerns. To
increase forensic capabilities, this article proposed seven steps
to enhance and secure digital evidence collection across ships
and ports for cyber-informed investigations, and mitigation
strategies. This can begin to improve the current state of
forensic readiness and help the maritime community, and those
that work with them, to have a better understanding of the
scope and scale of cyber-related incidents in their sector, and
have the capability to obtain the evidence needed to prevent,
prosecute, mitigate, analyse, and recover from incidents.
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